Human Rights or something better - what am I missing?

[Daniel L Heck]

Yes, I think agape is at the heart of this. But there is also a question of whether SSDI exists, is accesible, etc. These are defined in the political realm, and here I think we need to talk about rights...at the very least in our historical context. You might ask, "How does a state manifest agape?" That might be a good question. Maybe the problem is that we don't ask whether states are being loving enough.

However, I think there might be something important to the minimality of the concept of rights and the state's role in preserving and enforcing them, as part of a space-making function. Because I'm not so sure that a state can meaningfully practice agape love, in a full sense. For example, as valuable as social workers are, a state can't hire someone to be a friend. If you're hired to do something, I think that also abrogates the meaning of "real friendship" to some degree. A state also can't compel someone to be friends through the threat of punishment. Again, authentic friendship is outside of this sphere. However, a state can say that people have a right to SSDI, and it can easily arrange for the appropriate transfer of funds...and I think states have a responsibility to do things like this. The language of rights is integral to how this is expressed, and how it has been historically accomplished...and I think there are some good reasons for why it has historically developed this way, and why it might well make good sense for it to stay this way. Theologically, my reasoning is rooted in an understanding of our image-bearing status as something that confers rights, authority and inherent dignity on all human beings, which states are obliged to uphold and recognize...and which Jesus brings to a surprising peak when he identifies himself directly with those in need. States and societies that deface the image of God (and even God himself, according to eschatological judgment) tend to destroy themselves. States also get the Matthew 24-25 treatment...and actually, Matthew 24-25 is intimately connected to something that happened to a 'state.' And assessing how nations have done at distributing food, water and clothing is not, necessarily, something that involves friendship in a full sense of the word.

[Daniel L Heck]

In the previous example, I've been articulating how "rights" language is integrated into friendship in a modern state, and I think that's part of the picture.

I should add that I also think rights are an important part of friendship, and true agape love, at a more personal level as well, without any reference to states and legal systems. For example, if you tell me that you just need me to leave you alone and let you have some of your own space for a while, that is an implicit appeal to a right to a particular space. (It is YOURS and not mine, which is essentially a property claim.) A good friend, in that case, doesn't say, "You don't have a right to call some space yours. This possessive talk about "your" space, as if you own something that you're entitled to, is totally harshing our friendship's mellow."

Another aspect of this is that you can't lay down your rights, as an act of love, if you don't have rights to lay down in the first place. We're given things (to which we must have a real right) so that we can give them back, in love. But if we aren't given things in the first place, there is no possibility of giving them back, in love. If I don't have food or the rightful means to get it, I must starve or steal. I can only truly fast if I first, rightfully, have food.

[Michael Raburn]

Friendship doesn't depend on rights. Rights are things to be claimed, respect to be demanded. They serve a purpose in the world in that they sometimes help non-friends limit the violence they do to each other.

But that is not the work of the kingdom of God, where friendship is first what God invites us into, friendship with God's self, and at the same time friendship with each other. I think this is what was meant above by true or agape friendship, which is the only form of friendship Hauerwas uses the term for. Other things (like the boss example above) are not friendship and should not be confused as such.

In other words, Hauerwas would never say we "just" need friendship. Because friendship names the highest moral achievement (as Aristotle and Aquinas make clear). But we must be equally clear that friendship is achieved by pursuing virtues not by securing rights. Securing rights is what we do when we've given up the hope of being friends.

[Daniel L Heck]

In part, we might just have a disagreement on the nature of "rights." I'm trying to go with standard, general usage:

"Rights are legal, social, or ethical principles of freedom or entitlement; that is, rights are the fundamental normative rules about what is allowed of people or owed to people, according to some legal system, social convention, or ethical theory."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rights

Theologically, I think that rights are innate to human beings as image-bearers (and the notion of image-bearing connotes rights). So they don't need to be "secured" in order to exist. They are either acknowledged or not acknowledged, but they exist regardless. As a matter of moral/ethical theory, I think that they are perceived immediately by people (and are therefore not just a cognitive or theoretical construct) and that friendship must involve respect for these rights. In terms of moral psychology, I view rights language as an expression of universal moral perceptions (among non-sociopaths) of fairness, loyalty, care, sanctity and respect for legitimate authority.

I also don't see rights as in any way antagonistic to virtues or virtue ethics. On the contrary, I don't think that we can adequately articulate a satsifying virtue ethics without reference to rights (in their general sense). No need at all to set these things against each other.

Now maybe there is some particular intellectual articulation of the concept of rights that folks would like to pick at. If so, I'd just request that we be clear that we're talking about some particular articulation of rights, and which one. On the other hand, if you want to articulate an idea of "virtue" that doesn't include considering what is allowed or owed, I think you'll have a hard time of it.

And if we want to look at Aristotle on friendship, I'm happy to do that. As I understand it, his conception includes a shared and mutual pursuit of the good, but this incorporates shared pleasure and utility. He doesn't set the pursuit of the good against these "lower" forms of friendship, but instead sees it integrating them. IE: I don't think you'll find Aristotle saying "Friendship is a shared pursuit of the good, not a shared pursuit of utility." He doesn't negate too much. Also, Aristotle understands friendship as something that is only possible between people of shared standing, which involves a sense of "what is owed" to a person. (What we now call their rights.) We can't articulate an Aristotelean concept of friendship without reference to rights (or, more precisely, without reference to the same things that rights-language refers to.)

[Michael Raburn]

I think we're agreed on what rights names. I think we might have a fundamental disagreement on what imago Dei means. And/or what we can know immediately through natural theology as it were. But those might be rabbit trails for this convo.

Perhaps more specific to this discussion is that rights can be acknowledged, even granted, for people who we still view as very much not like us, as very much other. But that is not possible for friends. Which means rights afford us limited access to justice.

[Daniel L Heck]

I'd definitely agree that rights afford limited access to justice, and that they can be acknowledged for people who aren't friends. Similarly, I'd say that an adequate theory of justice (especially in a theological sense) must go beyond rights.

This all fits with what I'm suggesting, which we might put this way: the good involves more than rights, but not less than rights. Friendship, understood as a mutual pursuit of the good, then also involves a mutual "pursuit" of rights, but not less than that. Rights alone cannot constitute "true friendship," but true friendship involves respect for rights. I'd go so far as to say that in true friendship, rights find their proper teloi. And what are those teloi? I think they include the following: acknowledging the image of God in all other people (and so, the possibility of friendship with all other people), and ultimately voluntarily (not as a matter of necessity) laying down one's own rights out of love for others.

[Daniel L Heck]

One other piece of this: it might help to distinguish between demanding that another person respect your rights, and respecting the rights of other people. It is hard (impossible?) to have a friendship in which one person is constantly demanding respect for their rights.

On the other hand, I think that as a friend, I also wouldn't habitually infringe on the rights of a friend. I won't generally sneak into his house and take things without asking. I won't threaten him with bodily harm, or harm him. I won't demean him or deny him agency or respect that is due. All of these things would fundamentally undermine friendship, and they are essentially violations of rights. Without an observance of these kinds of boundaries, authentic friendship isn't really possible. This is basically what I mean when I say that respect for rights is part of friendship.

So I wonder if part of the disagreement here comes from different focii? What I'm saying seems rather obvious and minimal to me. But the sense I'm getting is that when we talk about rights, other people aren't necessarily thinking about violations of rights, like the ones listed above. In the case where those kinds of violations are happening, I think it is perfectly legitimate to demand respect for rights, and to articulate them clearly even if one doesn't demand them...and clarifying these legitimate boundaries is a pre-requisite for genuine friendship. Friendship proceeds on the basis of a generally unstated, mutual respect for other peoples' rights. In cases where rights are being violated, though, I don't blame the failure of friendship on those articulating and defending their rights. I think the main problem is the violation itself. To lose sight of this is to engage in victim-blaming.

Having said that, I think that the Gospels and Paul articulate a peculiar and redemptive approach to rights, in which friendship is made possible even in cases where rights are being routinely violated. In those cases, what we find articulated is a voluntary laying-down of rights, which are also clearly articulated, in order to make a unique form of redemption possible. (Although, for this redemptive action to reach it's goal, there does have to be a voluntary acknowledgment of rights from those who violate them...imho.)

Still, this redemptive action doesn't make sense unless rights are presumed. Unless Jesus was, in fact, the rightful King who voluntarily opted not to use his power, then he was just a pretender, rather than a just ruler restraining himself from violence. If Paul was full of crap when he claimed a right to income from his ministry, then his decision to engage in tent-making wasn't an act of love...in fact, his claim to deserve something was obnoxious pretense, and his tent-making was mere necessity. Rights must be real, for the voluntary surrender of them to be meaningful (as opposed to pretentious b.s.)

Or to take another example of the consistent role of rights in the New Testament, we can look at Romans 13:6-8: "This is also why you pay taxes, for the authorities are God’s servants, who give their full time to governing. Give to everyone what you owe them: If you owe taxes, pay taxes; if revenue, then revenue; if respect, then respect; if honor, then honor. Let no debt remain outstanding, except the continuing debt to love one another, for whoever loves others has fulfilled the law."

There is definitely complexity to this, and we can't ignore that this was written by a man who repeatedly got himself thrown in jail. At the same time, the notion of giving honor where it is due, paying taxes when they are due (even to a corrupt regime), and paying debts are all, I think, quite sincere...which is particularly remarkable, given the nature of the regime being discussed. Here's what I think we find here (and modeled throughout the New Testament): It is not a critique of rights, or a warning against them, but an entering into a (deeply flawed) system of "rights" that fulfills them in a way that transforms them. What we don't find is stuff like this, "People who claim that you owe them debt are making grasping claims to rights that none possess, because all that matters is love, and not rights. There are no inalienable rights. Rights depend on duties, and what duties are these people performing? People don't need rights, or an acknowledgment of their rights. They need friendship instead."

Instead, we find a complex, sincere and incarnational engagement with existing systems of rights that transforms them through engagement, rather than negation. Rights aren't rejected. They are split open from the inside, like the shell around a seed.

[Michael Raburn]

Well stated Daniel. But you have to acknowledge that what Paul is thinking of regarding debts, obligations, and kenotic surrender of power or provision is a long way from the distinctly modern notion of human rights. This is nowhere more evident than the difference between the NT examples you point to (which are always about surrender) versus modern rights (which are always about protection and entitlement). Pay attention to the verbs used in rights descriptions (i.e., http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/) and the difference becomes apparent.

And back to your friend example, I maintain that it is not rights you are thinking about when you decide how to treat a friend. You will think about how you care for them, want what will make them happy, what will strengthen your friendship. But you most likely are not thinking of their human rights. You can re-narrate your actions using rights language, but that thinking is not what animates action between friends.

[Daniel L Heck]

Thanks, Michael.

I'd agree that there was a major social transition from Roman law, in which rights were very unevenly acknowledged, and most modern law, which understands rights to be evenly distributed. In this, I think modern law is finally acknowledging something that is already present in Genesis 1-2, and which is worked out throughout the Biblical canon...but the basic notion is that all people are, in a basic sense, equally representatives of the ultimate sovereign. That's what universal image-bearing is about. I think that is the basic difference.

I don't think that the significant difference is that modern rights are no longer about debts and obligations. I think this is clearly what is at stake in the UN declaration: that all peoples and states have an obligation to treat all people in this way. The change is not a shift from a language of obligation and entitlement (in a pre-modern context) to one that doesn't involve these concepts. It is, rather, a shift from thinking that obligation and entitlement are invested in a few people as a matter of rank and special privilege, toward a universal and equal distribution of fundamental obligations and entitlements. So the language we find in the declaration includes: "(cannot) be compelled, has the right, entitled, duties, and equal in dignity." It also includes declarations in the form, "no one shall be," which lines up well with the declarative language of sovereigns throughout history. For example: http://droitromain.upmf-grenoble.fr/

I think that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights would be perfectly intelligible to a first century Roman, as the proclamation of rights by a sovereign. What would blow the Roman's mind isn't any shift in the concept of rights themselves, or even the language, but rather, a radically egalitarian shift in how they are understood to be distributed.

As to friendship: part of the irony here is that I only recently thought about your rights, in terms of our friendship. Specifically, I considered your right to control content within your Facebook feed. I decided that honoring your rights in that case, even though I disagreed with you, was important to maintaining a friendship with you. So while I disagreed with what I considered a non-kenotic exercise of rights, I chose to honor them and your right to control and define your own spaces. (I think this is a particularly nice example of how these concepts are natural, rather than a mere matter of convention. Notions of property are easily transferred into novel domains, well ahead of any law or explicitly-stated conventions.) In conflict situations, which friends definitely encounter, I think that rights definitely come up. These are limit cases that help to define the boundaries of friendship. And in those cases, I think the decision to honor the rights of another is essential. If I had instead decided to troll you (for your own damn good!), I suspect you would have literally "unfriended" me. At any rate, that would have been your right...and if you did, I would have respected it, as your right. While unfriending in Facebook isn't identitcal to real unfriending, I think the language is both telling and helpful, in understanding how rights actually relate to friendship. Rights define the boundaries of friendship and are foundational to it.

Insofar as rights-thinking fades from view in friendship, I would maintain that it is not because rights have stopped mattering, but because they can be taken for granted. And they can be taken for granted only so long as they are, in fact, respected. Once a violation occurs, they can't be taken for granted any more, and for genuine friendship to endure, respect for rights must be re-established. (For Christians, this is accomplished through kenotic emptying which also presumes a system of rights, and then uses them in a dramatically self-effacing way.) So if friends aren't thinking about rights or regularly being motivated by them, I don't take that as evidence that rights themselves have become unnecessary or even peripheral...it is, rather, evidence that focus on them has become unneccessary or peripheral, because they are in fact being honored. They become like water to a fish. They are invisible, but only because they are everywhere.

[Michael Raburn]

I think you overestimate how intelligible modern human rights would be to a 1st century person.

More to the point though, as good and useful as rights language maybe in negotiating life in the modern world, won't you at least acknowledge that as quite a separate project from bringing in the kingdom of God? That really was the rub in the session at SVS, whether we should conflate the project of modernity (which is squarely where Lockean-defined human rights is situated) with the project of preaching the Gospel that Jesus is Lord of a very different kind of kingdom. I am suggesting that these are two very different projects. One is built on the generic god of deism. The other used to understand that foundation as inadequate and contrary to its purpose. It seems like we are increasingly confused on this point.

[Daniel L Heck]

Well, you know, look at my title. I'm the liberal gnostic modernist here So of course I view universal human rights as an aspect of Christ's Kingdom coming. For example, I view the Civil Rights Movement as something that was ultimately driven by an authentic movement of the Holy Spirit.

And I'm glad the Catholic Church finally came around on this stuff. Took a while to get the old monarchism out of their heads. And don't get me started on Franco's Spain...

Are rights identical with Christ's Kingdom? Not at all. Are they an aspect of the "already and not yet" of the Kingdom? Yes. And I think this mapping goes quite deep. With the universal declaration of human rights, I think the kingdoms of the world (and the Church) are finally starting to catch up to Genesis 1.

Part of what I disliked about the session at SVS was how much  geneological critique ended up happening. This isn't the fault of anyone in the session...lots of sloppy geneological critique is common in this discussion, so I think we end up needing to address it. However, even when geneological critique is well-done, I don't think it has much relevance. We know things by their fruits, not their roots.

But as to the genealogy of human rights (insofar as we should worry about that), I'm with Wolterstorff. More to the point, as far as I'm concerned, I think that universal human rights make very good theological sense...not as an ultimate end, but as an essential part of the foundation lain by God.

[Michael Raburn]

I disagree. I grew up in the post-Civil Rights South and for all the good the Civil Rights Movement achieved (I'm going on the 50th Anniversary Freedom Ride next week to celebrate), not all that much has changed in the hearts, minds, and souls of the people. In some ways, the good achieved only drove the evil further into the dark where it became (if possible) more pernicious than before. We are seeing the fruit of that now even outside the South. So, no, I would not equate or conflate even the CRM with the kingdom of God.

Put another way, the difference may come down to Locke's understanding of revelation versus Barth's. My argument is that kingdom theology has to be grounded on Barth's account of revelation to maintain the tension of the already/not yet. The Lockean account collapses the tension.

[Daniel L Heck]

I don't share that narrative about the CRM. I agree that a lot hasn't changed (in North and South), but I don't blame that on the Civil Rights Movement. A lot hasn't changed in my heart, either. But that doesn't mean the Holy Spirit isn't active in the Vineyard. At any rate, I really don't think it is more pernicious at this point than it would be if African Americans were still denied as many rights as they were then. I think we have been enabled to focus on new issues, because some super-duper-ultra basic stuff finally got settled. Now we've moved on to super-ultra basic stuff. But yeah, I think things would be way worse if the CRM hadn't happened. I think the same underlying issues would still be there, probably even more strongly, and we'd still be focused on even more basic issues.

I'm not arguing for a simple Lockean account. However, I think I might be with the late Barth, over and against the early Barth, when he said, "[Revelation] does not remain transcendent over time, it does not merely meet it at a point, but it enters time; nay, it assumes time; nay, it creates time for itself.” It could be interesting to get into Barth's views on history, Creation and revelation. Insofar as Barth(2) makes room for revelation through Creation and History, I'm all for Barth(2). And insofar as we're engaged in a critique of a deistic conception of Creation and History, I'm all for that, too.

But why should we actually try to deeply engage the material and find common ground? I'll just go with this instead: no, YOU'RE the deist In taking on Barth's early negation of liberal modernism, you have preserved, precisely, the dualistic, gnostic, deistic presuppositions of liberal modernism, which separated Creation and History from the God of Scripture.

[Michael Raburn]

I'm afraid we didn't settle as much as we thought. Even the gains of the CRM are subject to rollback (this is happening in North Carolina right now). Those bent on denying African-Americans those basic rights have often found other ways to carry on. One of the worst ways was by trumpeting the CRM as a victory won, thus prematurely ending a battle that had only gotten started. Much work remains and some of it has to be redone.

And yet that that work is not equatable with kingdom work. Nein!

[Michael Raburn]

And I contest your narration of "Barth 2.0." Volume III of CD is quite consistent with volume I (and II). The narrative that he set aside or "outgrew" dialectic or reading his early phase as dualistic are not supported by a close and thorough reading of CD.