Society of Vineyard Scholars
Annual Conference => SVS 2015: Thinking with the Church, Thinking with the Vineyard => Previous Conferences => Human Rights, the Church, and the Kingdom of God => Topic started by: Brian Metzger on April 22, 2015, 11:35 AM
-
My perspective in this presentation was that Hauerwas staked out the Kingdom position and our two Kingdom theologians opted for positions based on human systems. I was baffled by this session. It seemed to me that Hauerwas argued that the Kingdom offers something better, something more robust than "rights." I asked a question for clarification and mentioned the sermon on the mount and Php 2 as examples of Kingdom living going beyond rights. Derek responded by talking about the beautitudes but I was thinking of "if someone forces you to go one mile...." a clear denial of my "right" as a Kingdom citizen as well as other examples in that context. Php 2 is an obvious plea from Paul to empty ourselves of whatever rights we may think we have in order to be like Jesus in attitude and action. Has anyone been doing anymore thinking about Kingdom theology and the idea of inalienable rights?
-
Interesting. Hauerwas seemed in part to object to human rights language because of a slippery slope argument, in which it's hard to "bound" such rights. This article seems thematically related:
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/offbeat/judge-gives-chimpanzees-human-rights-for-the-first-time/ar-AAbqjQo?ocid=iehp
-
I agree that it was kind of an odd session. I'm looking forward to receiving the written documents so that I can chew on them a bit more.
My general impression walking away from the session was the following:
- The concept of human rights developed in a Western context and makes sense primarily within that cultural context, and critique of the validity of the concept appears to be a matter of Westerners engaging in critical reflection on our own received tradition.
- The concept of human rights has had real and demonstrable pragmatic value for furthering the causes of reconciliation and justice in, e.g., South Africa.
- But acknowledging that pragmatic value doesn't really address the concerns of the critical reflection on the concept's validity mentioned above. All it really proves is that before we dismantle the concept of human rights, we better make darn sure that we have something better to put in its place.
The cynic in me wants to say that it seems all well and good to critique the concept of human rights as we sit in a position of privilege, but people in a position of privilege ought not to be the ones to do so. Another part of me wants to acknowledge that the concept does appear to be flawed and muddled and ought to be replaced by something better. I believe the Christian tradition does have the resources to provide something better, but until we articulate that clearly and boldly, I'm not going to advocate that we tear down the imperfect but serviceable structure we have now. After all, even if we do construct a better notion, it won't be perfect either. It might indeed be better, though, so why not give it a shot and see if we can?
-
I think human rights is absolutely the best the world has to offer. I think Hauerwas' point is that rights language and practice is still anemic compared to the Kingdom and that our call is to live in but not of the system of the world. If we can offer a better way, we should, and we can.
Human Rights, I would say, might be able to make me bake a cake for a same sex wedding, but it can't make me love the two people getting married. The Kingdom of God, however, active in my life as the Spirit and embodied by Jesus, can and does. Thus, the Kingdom is vastly superior to any sort of rights in that it can make friends out of enemies and bakers out of haters.
Hauerwas is clearly for all the things human rights wants to achieve, as am I, but the Kingdom offers a better way.
-
Sounds good to me. I think you've got a new research project, @Brian Metzger (https://www.vineyardscholars.org/forum/index.php?action=profile;u=36). I look forward to seeing what you come up with! :)
-
I was really interested in/hoping to hear more about Hauerwas' critique of Morphew's claim that our understanding of human rights is grounded in Scripture through the enlightenment and reformation (particularly Locke and Calvin as I recall). Hauerwas response seemed to amount to "I don't really want to follow in the footsteps/reasoning of Locke and Calvin".
I know that Locke did ground his understanding of human rights (life, liberty, and property) in his belief that we are fundamentally God's property, but as I read Locke, he also believes that those rights inexorably demand the establishment of a social contract. I can definitely see how Hauerwas would want to avoid contract as the lens through which we interpret our relationships with one another, and the historical argument both of them made would seem to suggest that the human rights construction is fundamentally bound up in an earthly politics rather than a politics of Kingdom. Would it be appropriate to say that human rights analysis is the what Jesus' followers might use if His Kingdom were of this world? And if so then is it a necessary corollary to say that since His Kingdom is not of this world, rights are not a great framework for understanding the value and dignity of those who bear the imago dei?
-
I don't know about Hauerwas, but the distinction is usually made between natural rights--what you have just because you are a human being--and legal rights--what you get from the government. Social contract theory has to do with the latter. Locke believed in both types of rights, with the source of natural rights being God, of course.
-
Right but if I am understanding the Second Treatise correctly, Locke starts with natural rights and argues that legal rights, together with the social contract and eventually a state are necessary to escape an otherwise inevitable state of war. Thus civil society is built on a foundation of natural (human) rights, without them, Locke cannot justify his social contract.
-
That might be right, but I'm not sure about the last claim. Hobbes, for example, justified the social contract purely on the grounds that everyone wants out of the state of nature, at least in the long run. He and Locke had very different views about natural rights, however.
-
Again, I'm not sure I read the Leviathan that way. I take Hobbes to be affirming a set of natural (human) rights as well, only he argues that in order to guarantee the one he sees as most important (the right to life), we are forced to abrogate all other rights to the State (the Leviathan). Locke is more optimistic in thinking that individuals are able to maintain a larger selection of their rights in the creation of a state, but both seem to be basing their social contract on a doctrine of natural rights and the desire to avoid a state of war.
-
Hobbes on natural rights:
First law of nature: Seek peace and follow it.
The second branch contains in summary form the right of nature, which is the right to defend ourselves by any means we can.
From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to seek peace, is derived this second law:
Second law of nature: When a man thinks that peace and self-defence require it, he should be willing (when others are too) to lay down his right to everything, and should be contented with as much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself.
For as long as every man maintains his right to do anything he likes, all men are in the condition of war. But if other men won’t also lay down their right, there is no reason for him to divest himself of his; for ·if he alone gave up his rights· that would be to expose himself to predators (which no man is obliged to do) rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is the law of the Gospel: Whatever you require others to do to you, do it to them.
And this law of all men: Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris—·Don’t do to others what you don’t want done to you.
[In the interests of clarity, the next paragraph is written in terms of
‘I and ‘you’, replacing Hobbes’s ‘a man’ and ‘another’.] For me to lay down my right to something is for me to deprive myself of the liberty of blocking you (for instance) from getting the benefit of your right to the same thing. In renouncing or giving up my right I don’t give anyone else a right that he didn’t previously have, because every man has a right by nature to everything. All I do in renouncing my own right·is to stand out of your way, so that you can enjoy your own original right without interference from me; but you may still be impeded by some third person. Thus, the effect on you of my lacking a certain right is just a lessening of hindrances to your exercise of your original right
In other words, "This land is my land, this land is your land...so let's all kill each other. Therefore...authoritarianism based on the consent of the crushed!"
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/hobbes1651part1.pdf
-
My main critique of Hauerwas is that he negates too much...maybe even for himself.
For example:
"Like Wolterstorff, I too want those who suffer from Alzheimers to have the care that befits their status as human beings. Such care I believe, moreover, is a matter of justice. But I do not think such care is more likely to be forthcoming or sustained by a natural right theory of justice. Instead, what is required is the recovery of communion made possible through the works of mercy.
In particular, a text such as Matthew 25:31-45 makes clear that the works of mercy are not principles or values that then must be translated into a more universal or secular vision of justice. Rather they summon us to participate in God's redemption by feeding the hungry, giving drink to the thirsty, clothing the naked, harbouring the stranger, visiting the sick, ministering to prisoners and burying the dead. This is how we learn what it means for Jesus to be the justice of God.
I know of no book that exemplifies better this understanding of Jesus as God's justice than Hans Reinders's Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theological Anthropology, and Ethics. Reinders observes that much good has been done in the name of disability-rights for creating new opportunities as well as institutional space for the disabled. But such an understanding of justice is not sufficient if we listen to the disabled. They do not seek to be tolerated or even respected because they have rights. Rather they seek to share their lives with us and they want us to want to share our lives with them. In short they want us to be claimed and to claim one another in friendship."
It is one thing to say, (1) "We don't need rights. We just need friendship." It is another thing entirely to say, (2) "Rights are a good step, but they aren't sufficient, and they aren't the end we ultimately aim for, which can't be delivered by rights alone." Sometimes, Hauerwas says the first. (It is what he said to me, at SVS). But then, he goes on to articulate the second. I have big problems with (1), but I'm totally in agreement with (2).
I'd also say that good friendships integrate a respect for the rights of other people, and so setting friendship against rights isn't really helpful. Friendship includes and extends beyond respect for the rights of others. However, an acknowledgment of rights is in no way a threat to real friendship. When rights are violated, friendship is also violated...and respect for the rights of another person is an essential aspect of restoring friendship in these cases. Friendship is altogether bigger than rights, but it contains and depends on them. Friendship without rights is an abusive boss sidling up to you and acting like your friend.
I'd articulate my problems with (1) by insisting on reading Matthew 25:31-45 in the context of Matthew 24-25, as part of God's judgment on a legal and political system (Herod's Second Temple "Israel"). Because reading Matthew 25 in the context of Matthew's Gospel more broadly is really all that I ever do :)
-
@Daniel L Heck (https://www.vineyardscholars.org/forum/index.php?action=profile;u=425) I really like your breakdown/distinction regarding rights and friendship but it strikes me that where Hauerwas claimed that rights were fine so long as they are understood as a secular and limited expression of the call to love and value all creation (and particularly God's image bearers), your understanding of friendship (as insufficient on its own) does not account for what might be called "true friendship." So I would be really comfortable saying that Agape is the best framework/language for motivating human relationships - far superior to human rights. And as I see it, "friendship" may or may not mean "agape towards persons". If it does then Friendship would seem to be your "greater than rights" construction, whereas if it means anything else it is your "less than rights" construction. I haven't read any Hauerwas (gonna get on that asap though) but is it possible that he is defining friendship as "agape towards persons" which would resolve the apparent tension in what he was saying last week?
-
@Bill Hoard (https://www.vineyardscholars.org/forum/index.php?action=profile;u=596) I can see how my comments might have been confusing, and I think we probably agree on what "true friendship" looks like. I'm saying that friendship must include respect for rights (and more) to be "true friendship." So if I talk about "friendship minus rights" I'm talking about something less than true friendship...it is incoherent. Your jerk boss isn't really your friend, even if he gets you a cup of water when you're thirsty, if he also tries to keep you from getting health care benefits. So I think that saying, "Disabled people don't need rights, they need friends," is basically incoherent. Friends of the disabled advocate for their rights. Literally. I'm sure, at this very moment, the friends of a lot of disabled and homeless people are advocating for their rights in all kinds of ways. They may be speaking to legislators, working with lawyers or wrestling their way through the SSDI system. That isn't all they do, but it is one of the things involved in friendship.
Just one personal example: I have a good friend who has severe birth defects. She lived with us for several years as her condition worsened, and we supported her as she worked her way through the SSDI system to get the benefits to which we believed she was entitled. They are her right (I would say as a matter of both positive and natural law.) However, she was initially rejected (as often happens), and my wife (a paralegal) provided her with some advice throughout the process. It would have been really, really gross for me to say to her, "You don't need rights. You just need our friendship. So we aren't going to help you with the SSDI process. Just rely on God, and get rid of your grasping, nasty sense of entitlement. Rights. Pfah! This "rights" $hi+ is totally getting out of hand. What duty are you performing that justifies you claiming SSDI? Rights stem from duties, you know." What kind of friend would say crap like that?
Having said that, our friendship was about a whole lot more than advocating for her rights and helping her recieve the benefits to which she was entitled by (relatively) just laws. But if it were about less than that, given how close we were, I don't think it could be an authentic friendship.
And back to Hauerwas: I think there is a lot of tension between his different statements. That's just part of being Hauerwas...and probably part of being human :) So I should be clear that, here, I'm responding to some specific things he has said, and one of the central ways he frames the discussion. Insofar as Hauerwas(2) disagrees with Hauerwas(1), I'm totally with Hauerwas(2). :)
-
So the thing is, if friendship is defined as "agape towards persons" the in your example, wouldn't that lead friends to say something closer to "you don't need rights because as your friends we are, of course, going to help you with this Side process". What I am thinking is that if rights language limits my responsibility toward the other, agape has no limits. Rights says "I and the state are morally obligated to go so far" and that is certainly better than nothing, but agape says "I love you and will go as far as you need without looking to my own rights". Maybe I am not seeing the limitation to friendship (understood as agape towards persons) that you are?
-
Yes, I think agape is at the heart of this. But there is also a question of whether SSDI exists, is accesible, etc. These are defined in the political realm, and here I think we need to talk about rights...at the very least in our historical context. You might ask, "How does a state manifest agape?" That might be a good question. Maybe the problem is that we don't ask whether states are being loving enough.
However, I think there might be something important to the minimality of the concept of rights and the state's role in preserving and enforcing them, as part of a space-making function. Because I'm not so sure that a state can meaningfully practice agape love, in a full sense. For example, as valuable as social workers are, a state can't hire someone to be a friend. If you're hired to do something, I think that also abrogates the meaning of "real friendship" to some degree. A state also can't compel someone to be friends through the threat of punishment. Again, authentic friendship is outside of this sphere. However, a state can say that people have a right to SSDI, and it can easily arrange for the appropriate transfer of funds...and I think states have a responsibility to do things like this. The language of rights is integral to how this is expressed, and how it has been historically accomplished...and I think there are some good reasons for why it has historically developed this way, and why it might well make good sense for it to stay this way. Theologically, my reasoning is rooted in an understanding of our image-bearing status as something that confers rights, authority and inherent dignity on all human beings, which states are obliged to uphold and recognize...and which Jesus brings to a surprising peak when he identifies himself directly with those in need. States and societies that deface the image of God (and even God himself, according to eschatological judgment) tend to destroy themselves. States also get the Matthew 24-25 treatment...and actually, Matthew 24-25 is intimately connected to something that happened to a 'state.' And assessing how nations have done at distributing food, water and clothing is not, necessarily, something that involves friendship in a full sense of the word.
-
In the previous example, I've been articulating how "rights" language is integrated into friendship in a modern state, and I think that's part of the picture.
I should add that I also think rights are an important part of friendship, and true agape love, at a more personal level as well, without any reference to states and legal systems. For example, if you tell me that you just need me to leave you alone and let you have some of your own space for a while, that is an implicit appeal to a right to a particular space. (It is YOURS and not mine, which is essentially a property claim.) A good friend, in that case, doesn't say, "You don't have a right to call some space yours. This possessive talk about "your" space, as if you own something that you're entitled to, is totally harshing our friendship's mellow."
Another aspect of this is that you can't lay down your rights, as an act of love, if you don't have rights to lay down in the first place. We're given things (to which we must have a real right) so that we can give them back, in love. But if we aren't given things in the first place, there is no possibility of giving them back, in love. If I don't have food or the rightful means to get it, I must starve or steal. I can only truly fast if I first, rightfully, have food.
-
Friendship doesn't depend on rights. Rights are things to be claimed, respect to be demanded. They serve a purpose in the world in that they sometimes help non-friends limit the violence they do to each other.
But that is not the work of the kingdom of God, where friendship is first what God invites us into, friendship with God's self, and at the same time friendship with each other. I think this is what was meant above by true or agape friendship, which is the only form of friendship Hauerwas uses the term for. Other things (like the boss example above) are not friendship and should not be confused as such.
In other words, Hauerwas would never say we "just" need friendship. Because friendship names the highest moral achievement (as Aristotle and Aquinas make clear). But we must be equally clear that friendship is achieved by pursuing virtues not by securing rights. Securing rights is what we do when we've given up the hope of being friends.
-
In part, we might just have a disagreement on the nature of "rights." I'm trying to go with standard, general usage:
"Rights are legal, social, or ethical principles of freedom or entitlement; that is, rights are the fundamental normative rules about what is allowed of people or owed to people, according to some legal system, social convention, or ethical theory."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rights
Theologically, I think that rights are innate to human beings as image-bearers (and the notion of image-bearing connotes rights). So they don't need to be "secured" in order to exist. They are either acknowledged or not acknowledged, but they exist regardless. As a matter of moral/ethical theory, I think that they are perceived immediately by people (and are therefore not just a cognitive or theoretical construct) and that friendship must involve respect for these rights. In terms of moral psychology, I view rights language as an expression of universal moral perceptions (among non-sociopaths) of fairness, loyalty, care, sanctity and respect for legitimate authority.
I also don't see rights as in any way antagonistic to virtues or virtue ethics. On the contrary, I don't think that we can adequately articulate a satsifying virtue ethics without reference to rights (in their general sense). No need at all to set these things against each other.
Now maybe there is some particular intellectual articulation of the concept of rights that folks would like to pick at. If so, I'd just request that we be clear that we're talking about some particular articulation of rights, and which one. On the other hand, if you want to articulate an idea of "virtue" that doesn't include considering what is allowed or owed, I think you'll have a hard time of it.
And if we want to look at Aristotle on friendship, I'm happy to do that. As I understand it, his conception includes a shared and mutual pursuit of the good, but this incorporates shared pleasure and utility. He doesn't set the pursuit of the good against these "lower" forms of friendship, but instead sees it integrating them. IE: I don't think you'll find Aristotle saying "Friendship is a shared pursuit of the good, not a shared pursuit of utility." He doesn't negate too much. Also, Aristotle understands friendship as something that is only possible between people of shared standing, which involves a sense of "what is owed" to a person. (What we now call their rights.) We can't articulate an Aristotelean concept of friendship without reference to rights (or, more precisely, without reference to the same things that rights-language refers to.)
-
I think we're agreed on what rights names. I think we might have a fundamental disagreement on what imago Dei means. And/or what we can know immediately through natural theology as it were. But those might be rabbit trails for this convo.
Perhaps more specific to this discussion is that rights can be acknowledged, even granted, for people who we still view as very much not like us, as very much other. But that is not possible for friends. Which means rights afford us limited access to justice.
-
I'd definitely agree that rights afford limited access to justice, and that they can be acknowledged for people who aren't friends. Similarly, I'd say that an adequate theory of justice (especially in a theological sense) must go beyond rights.
This all fits with what I'm suggesting, which we might put this way: the good involves more than rights, but not less than rights. Friendship, understood as a mutual pursuit of the good, then also involves a mutual "pursuit" of rights, but not less than that. Rights alone cannot constitute "true friendship," but true friendship involves respect for rights. I'd go so far as to say that in true friendship, rights find their proper teloi. And what are those teloi? I think they include the following: acknowledging the image of God in all other people (and so, the possibility of friendship with all other people), and ultimately voluntarily (not as a matter of necessity) laying down one's own rights out of love for others.
-
One other piece of this: it might help to distinguish between demanding that another person respect your rights, and respecting the rights of other people. It is hard (impossible?) to have a friendship in which one person is constantly demanding respect for their rights.
On the other hand, I think that as a friend, I also wouldn't habitually infringe on the rights of a friend. I won't generally sneak into his house and take things without asking. I won't threaten him with bodily harm, or harm him. I won't demean him or deny him agency or respect that is due. All of these things would fundamentally undermine friendship, and they are essentially violations of rights. Without an observance of these kinds of boundaries, authentic friendship isn't really possible. This is basically what I mean when I say that respect for rights is part of friendship.
So I wonder if part of the disagreement here comes from different focii? What I'm saying seems rather obvious and minimal to me. But the sense I'm getting is that when we talk about rights, other people aren't necessarily thinking about violations of rights, like the ones listed above. In the case where those kinds of violations are happening, I think it is perfectly legitimate to demand respect for rights, and to articulate them clearly even if one doesn't demand them...and clarifying these legitimate boundaries is a pre-requisite for genuine friendship. Friendship proceeds on the basis of a generally unstated, mutual respect for other peoples' rights. In cases where rights are being violated, though, I don't blame the failure of friendship on those articulating and defending their rights. I think the main problem is the violation itself. To lose sight of this is to engage in victim-blaming.
Having said that, I think that the Gospels and Paul articulate a peculiar and redemptive approach to rights, in which friendship is made possible even in cases where rights are being routinely violated. In those cases, what we find articulated is a voluntary laying-down of rights, which are also clearly articulated, in order to make a unique form of redemption possible. (Although, for this redemptive action to reach it's goal, there does have to be a voluntary acknowledgment of rights from those who violate them...imho.)
Still, this redemptive action doesn't make sense unless rights are presumed. Unless Jesus was, in fact, the rightful King who voluntarily opted not to use his power, then he was just a pretender, rather than a just ruler restraining himself from violence. If Paul was full of crap when he claimed a right to income from his ministry, then his decision to engage in tent-making wasn't an act of love...in fact, his claim to deserve something was obnoxious pretense, and his tent-making was mere necessity. Rights must be real, for the voluntary surrender of them to be meaningful (as opposed to pretentious b.s.)
Or to take another example of the consistent role of rights in the New Testament, we can look at Romans 13:6-8: "This is also why you pay taxes, for the authorities are God’s servants, who give their full time to governing. Give to everyone what you owe them: If you owe taxes, pay taxes; if revenue, then revenue; if respect, then respect; if honor, then honor. Let no debt remain outstanding, except the continuing debt to love one another, for whoever loves others has fulfilled the law."
There is definitely complexity to this, and we can't ignore that this was written by a man who repeatedly got himself thrown in jail. At the same time, the notion of giving honor where it is due, paying taxes when they are due (even to a corrupt regime), and paying debts are all, I think, quite sincere...which is particularly remarkable, given the nature of the regime being discussed. Here's what I think we find here (and modeled throughout the New Testament): It is not a critique of rights, or a warning against them, but an entering into a (deeply flawed) system of "rights" that fulfills them in a way that transforms them. What we don't find is stuff like this, "People who claim that you owe them debt are making grasping claims to rights that none possess, because all that matters is love, and not rights. There are no inalienable rights. Rights depend on duties, and what duties are these people performing? People don't need rights, or an acknowledgment of their rights. They need friendship instead."
Instead, we find a complex, sincere and incarnational engagement with existing systems of rights that transforms them through engagement, rather than negation. Rights aren't rejected. They are split open from the inside, like the shell around a seed.
-
Well stated Daniel. But you have to acknowledge that what Paul is thinking of regarding debts, obligations, and kenotic surrender of power or provision is a long way from the distinctly modern notion of human rights. This is nowhere more evident than the difference between the NT examples you point to (which are always about surrender) versus modern rights (which are always about protection and entitlement). Pay attention to the verbs used in rights descriptions (i.e., http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/) and the difference becomes apparent.
And back to your friend example, I maintain that it is not rights you are thinking about when you decide how to treat a friend. You will think about how you care for them, want what will make them happy, what will strengthen your friendship. But you most likely are not thinking of their human rights. You can re-narrate your actions using rights language, but that thinking is not what animates action between friends.
-
Thanks, Michael.
I'd agree that there was a major social transition from Roman law, in which rights were very unevenly acknowledged, and most modern law, which understands rights to be evenly distributed. In this, I think modern law is finally acknowledging something that is already present in Genesis 1-2, and which is worked out throughout the Biblical canon...but the basic notion is that all people are, in a basic sense, equally representatives of the ultimate sovereign. That's what universal image-bearing is about. I think that is the basic difference.
I don't think that the significant difference is that modern rights are no longer about debts and obligations. I think this is clearly what is at stake in the UN declaration: that all peoples and states have an obligation to treat all people in this way. The change is not a shift from a language of obligation and entitlement (in a pre-modern context) to one that doesn't involve these concepts. It is, rather, a shift from thinking that obligation and entitlement are invested in a few people as a matter of rank and special privilege, toward a universal and equal distribution of fundamental obligations and entitlements. So the language we find in the declaration includes: "(cannot) be compelled, has the right, entitled, duties, and equal in dignity." It also includes declarations in the form, "no one shall be," which lines up well with the declarative language of sovereigns throughout history. For example: http://droitromain.upmf-grenoble.fr/
I think that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights would be perfectly intelligible to a first century Roman, as the proclamation of rights by a sovereign. What would blow the Roman's mind isn't any shift in the concept of rights themselves, or even the language, but rather, a radically egalitarian shift in how they are understood to be distributed.
As to friendship: part of the irony here is that I only recently thought about your rights, in terms of our friendship. Specifically, I considered your right to control content within your Facebook feed. I decided that honoring your rights in that case, even though I disagreed with you, was important to maintaining a friendship with you. So while I disagreed with what I considered a non-kenotic exercise of rights, I chose to honor them and your right to control and define your own spaces. (I think this is a particularly nice example of how these concepts are natural, rather than a mere matter of convention. Notions of property are easily transferred into novel domains, well ahead of any law or explicitly-stated conventions.) In conflict situations, which friends definitely encounter, I think that rights definitely come up. These are limit cases that help to define the boundaries of friendship. And in those cases, I think the decision to honor the rights of another is essential. If I had instead decided to troll you (for your own damn good!), I suspect you would have literally "unfriended" me. At any rate, that would have been your right...and if you did, I would have respected it, as your right. While unfriending in Facebook isn't identitcal to real unfriending, I think the language is both telling and helpful, in understanding how rights actually relate to friendship. Rights define the boundaries of friendship and are foundational to it.
Insofar as rights-thinking fades from view in friendship, I would maintain that it is not because rights have stopped mattering, but because they can be taken for granted. And they can be taken for granted only so long as they are, in fact, respected. Once a violation occurs, they can't be taken for granted any more, and for genuine friendship to endure, respect for rights must be re-established. (For Christians, this is accomplished through kenotic emptying which also presumes a system of rights, and then uses them in a dramatically self-effacing way.) So if friends aren't thinking about rights or regularly being motivated by them, I don't take that as evidence that rights themselves have become unnecessary or even peripheral...it is, rather, evidence that focus on them has become unneccessary or peripheral, because they are in fact being honored. They become like water to a fish. They are invisible, but only because they are everywhere.
-
I think you overestimate how intelligible modern human rights would be to a 1st century person.
More to the point though, as good and useful as rights language maybe in negotiating life in the modern world, won't you at least acknowledge that as quite a separate project from bringing in the kingdom of God? That really was the rub in the session at SVS, whether we should conflate the project of modernity (which is squarely where Lockean-defined human rights is situated) with the project of preaching the Gospel that Jesus is Lord of a very different kind of kingdom. I am suggesting that these are two very different projects. One is built on the generic god of deism. The other used to understand that foundation as inadequate and contrary to its purpose. It seems like we are increasingly confused on this point.
-
Well, you know, look at my title. I'm the liberal gnostic modernist here ;) So of course I view universal human rights as an aspect of Christ's Kingdom coming. For example, I view the Civil Rights Movement as something that was ultimately driven by an authentic movement of the Holy Spirit.
And I'm glad the Catholic Church finally came around on this stuff. Took a while to get the old monarchism out of their heads. And don't get me started on Franco's Spain...
Are rights identical with Christ's Kingdom? Not at all. Are they an aspect of the "already and not yet" of the Kingdom? Yes. And I think this mapping goes quite deep. With the universal declaration of human rights, I think the kingdoms of the world (and the Church) are finally starting to catch up to Genesis 1.
Part of what I disliked about the session at SVS was how much geneological critique ended up happening. This isn't the fault of anyone in the session...lots of sloppy geneological critique is common in this discussion, so I think we end up needing to address it. However, even when geneological critique is well-done, I don't think it has much relevance. We know things by their fruits, not their roots.
But as to the genealogy of human rights (insofar as we should worry about that), I'm with Wolterstorff. More to the point, as far as I'm concerned, I think that universal human rights make very good theological sense...not as an ultimate end, but as an essential part of the foundation lain by God.
-
I disagree. I grew up in the post-Civil Rights South and for all the good the Civil Rights Movement achieved (I'm going on the 50th Anniversary Freedom Ride next week to celebrate), not all that much has changed in the hearts, minds, and souls of the people. In some ways, the good achieved only drove the evil further into the dark where it became (if possible) more pernicious than before. We are seeing the fruit of that now even outside the South. So, no, I would not equate or conflate even the CRM with the kingdom of God.
Put another way, the difference may come down to Locke's understanding of revelation versus Barth's. My argument is that kingdom theology has to be grounded on Barth's account of revelation to maintain the tension of the already/not yet. The Lockean account collapses the tension.
-
I don't share that narrative about the CRM. I agree that a lot hasn't changed (in North and South), but I don't blame that on the Civil Rights Movement. A lot hasn't changed in my heart, either. But that doesn't mean the Holy Spirit isn't active in the Vineyard. At any rate, I really don't think it is more pernicious at this point than it would be if African Americans were still denied as many rights as they were then. I think we have been enabled to focus on new issues, because some super-duper-ultra basic stuff finally got settled. Now we've moved on to super-ultra basic stuff. But yeah, I think things would be way worse if the CRM hadn't happened. I think the same underlying issues would still be there, probably even more strongly, and we'd still be focused on even more basic issues.
I'm not arguing for a simple Lockean account. However, I think I might be with the late Barth, over and against the early Barth, when he said, "[Revelation] does not remain transcendent over time, it does not merely meet it at a point, but it enters time; nay, it assumes time; nay, it creates time for itself.” It could be interesting to get into Barth's views on history, Creation and revelation. Insofar as Barth(2) makes room for revelation through Creation and History, I'm all for Barth(2). And insofar as we're engaged in a critique of a deistic conception of Creation and History, I'm all for that, too.
But why should we actually try to deeply engage the material and find common ground? I'll just go with this instead: no, YOU'RE the deist :P In taking on Barth's early negation of liberal modernism, you have preserved, precisely, the dualistic, gnostic, deistic presuppositions of liberal modernism, which separated Creation and History from the God of Scripture. ;)
-
I'm afraid we didn't settle as much as we thought. Even the gains of the CRM are subject to rollback (this is happening in North Carolina right now). Those bent on denying African-Americans those basic rights have often found other ways to carry on. One of the worst ways was by trumpeting the CRM as a victory won, thus prematurely ending a battle that had only gotten started. Much work remains and some of it has to be redone.
And yet that that work is not equatable with kingdom work. Nein!
-
And I contest your narration of "Barth 2.0." Volume III of CD is quite consistent with volume I (and II). The narrative that he set aside or "outgrew" dialectic or reading his early phase as dualistic are not supported by a close and thorough reading of CD.
-
I'm not sure what "not equatable with kingdom work," means. I think that the work of Civil Rights is Kingdom work. It isn't all of it, to be sure...Kingdom work is absolutely not reducible to Civil Rights! And to be sure, we haven't even achieved equal rights, in practice, by a long shot. What's more, even where rights are being respected, with an understanding that this has been accomplished through the grace and power of God, the nature of rights is such that these are only the very first, faltering steps toward the "beloved community." (A community of friendship.)
At the same time, when I help my daughter learn to walk, I think that this is Kingdom work. That doesn't mean that Kingdom work is reducible to this! And if I were to mistake these sweet, faltering steps for the end (even the very proximate end of walking), that would be a major problem. I think something analagous has actually happened with the CRM. If I became so obsessed with these faltering steps that I just kept trying to reproduce them, and looked back on them as "the good old days" that we needed to get back to, that would also be all wrong. If she were injured and became unable to walk, that would be a tragedy, but it wouldn't be an argument against helping children learn to walk. (And by the same token, rollback of the CRM is hardly an argument against it!) Even if it were the case that walking had played a role in my daughter's injury, that still wouldn't be a general argument against children learning to walk.
So I'm totally with you, in not wanting to hail CRM as any kind of ultimate victory. Still, I think it was a battle won, and we do need to celebrate when battles are won. Then, we need to advance. However, I don't see how a critique of human rights helps us advance at all...and it also doesn't look like a tactical retreat to me. It just reads like apologetics for the Old South, or Franco's Spain or celebration of the 20th Century's "Catholics gone stale." (And my Hitler reference should totally be read in the context of Taube's interactions with Heidegger and Schmitt. This is high-brow Hitler! But seriously, if we're talking Barth, I do think we do need to lay out some of the various efforts to reckon with the catastrophes of German nationalism.)
https://books.google.com/books?id=4ZLCAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA171&lpg=PA171&dq=catholics+gone+stale+taube&source=bl&ots=yvSZtzXst1&sig=4dKxM28KxxqW09wkyh25g6Nf4ko&hl=en&sa=X&ei=5M9AVZ3wOMeuggTfloHwCQ&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=catholics%20gone%20stale%20taube&f=false
-
As to Barth: you're the real Barth scholar. I'm passingly familiar with him.
I was talking about Barth's warnings against the early Barth of Romans, though, to be clear on the reference. I was cribbing from this discussion: https://dogmatics.wordpress.com/2015/03/04/barth-on-revelation-and-history/
To be perfectly clear, my reference to Barth as a liberal gnostic modernist was entirely meant as a joke. I am not at all familiar with the narratives about Barth...I just figured something like that must exist, because that's the kind of thing some humanities scholars would say. (I did take GER 801, Advanced I'm Rubber You're Glue.)
More seriously, I'd like to work through Barth's views of history and creation, as they relate to revelation! Any suggested reading on that, in an introductory way, for a total Barth noob?
-
Let me be clear, I am a huge fan of the CRM. I shoe horn "Letter from Birmingham Jail" into any class I can (last fall I used it in a "Critical Thinking" class which was perhaps the biggest stretch yet). And from all my study of the CRM, I don't think MLK would call what they accomplished a victory. That is not the tone of the sermon the night before he was killed. They made a good beginning, but it was like prep work, clearing brush, digging footers, setting up form boards. They were just getting to laying an actual foundation when the whole thing got short circuited and coopted. When it came time for more substantial reforms, specifically economic and housing equality, they found resistance much more persistent and resilient. I am in no way pining for any 'good old days,' there is no lie like nostalgia. I am saying the work of the CRM has to be carried on and redone and probably will always need attention precisely because it cannot address the evil that lies in the hearts of humans because this is not kingdom work, it is world-improving work. Worthwhile work. Good work. But not work that brings the kingdom in.
I do have recommendations on Barth, including a free book you can download: http://mikeraburn.com/2009/05/16/free-book-for-you/
-
I was really struck by a bit of this conversation a little back, where y'all were still discussing the relationship between friendship and rights models. It seems to me that a very real (and I think generally admitted) aspect of, at least, negative rights is the humility of their claim. Negative human rights seem to function as a pragmatic lowest common denominator for human interaction. Agape Friendship on the other hand functions as an infinite ideal which we are being called to.
During my time as a confirmed libertarian (which this conference has recently called into serious question - thanks folks), I liked to point out that the great strength of libertarianism as a political movement was the humility of its claims: Most libertarians don't think that their political programme would achieve utopia even if it were perfectly implemented - persons would have to do that out of their voluntary decision making. Instead Libertarians see the strength of their position as a supreme defense of the lowest common denominators (and therefore most fundamentally necessary) of human interaction.
I am still fairly sanguine in my conviction that Libertarianism (classical-liberalism) in its essentials may represent the best political system the world (empire?) is able to offer. My question is whether, as those who are committed to The King and His Kingdom, we should be paying attention to an LCD or should we be reaching for the Not Yet. Are the two mutually exclusive? (I'm guessing @Daniel L Heck (https://www.vineyardscholars.org/forum/index.php?action=profile;u=425) thinks not). It looks to me like the CRM did bring the Kingdom a little more "on earth" than before, but also (as a current Baltimore resident) the Kingdom is definitely not yet "now" in our society.
So what would be lost if we gave up the language of human rights in favor of a language of agape friendship?
Does real friendship towards all allow for any evil that human rights models would prevent?
On a personal level, it has struck me these last few days that my heart has been moved far more for the suffering of the people and city I love (with my imperfect agape) than by the identifiable abuses of human rights. That is only to say that agape friendship seems to have more motive, and affective, power over me than human rights.
A little ramble-y there at the end, but I really appreciate this conversation.
-
Very cool. Thanks Michael! I'll read that and Church Dogmatics today, and get back to you by the early afternoon. ;)
-
@Bill Hoard (https://www.vineyardscholars.org/forum/index.php?action=profile;u=596)
I think you're at least partially right about the affective effectiveness of "love" and "friendship" language. At times, it is more effective at mobilizing people. However, in general, the violation of rights (and the defensive reaction it evokes) is much more effective. I can get into the individual and group psychology of this, if you like...but I also suspect that isn't really what you're after.
What I would say is that a sincere pursuit of love will always also integrate respect for rights. If respect for rights is seen as an impediment to real friendship, or love is used as a substitute for rights, then I think it becomes suspect to claim that friendship or love are actually on the table at all.
For example,here are some Old South apologetics: "Slavery was instituted out of paternal love for slaves. They were better off without rights, and the affective bonds between master and slave were a true model of Christian love. We were friends in Christ. But then, those grasping, greedy slaves were mislead into upsetting this Godly order of things with their selfish, grasping demands for rights...and ended up worse off for it. Everything would have been better if we had sustained the "beloved community" of the Old South, instead of overthrowing it with all of this modern, secular humanist, liberal nonsense about "human rights." We would've gotten to a more advanced state for the Negro in good time, if he had been allowed to mature according to his own natural limitations..."
What's wrong with this picture? I would say that, in part, the problem is that the appeal to love is total bullshit. And one of the tells is that it is paired with a critique of rights...rather than a recognition of the role of rights as a boundary condition for authentic friendship.
(Also, I think it gets the maturation story exactly backwards. I think that the church, and especially the black churches, have been teaching our state and our culture the basics about being a decent society that doesn't assault the inherent dignity of God's image-bearers. We have been slow and stubborn students.)
-
I've been enjoying the back-and-forth between @Michael Raburn (https://www.vineyardscholars.org/forum/index.php?action=profile;u=307) and @Daniel L Heck (https://www.vineyardscholars.org/forum/index.php?action=profile;u=425) here. I wonder if the following might be useful for addressing a couple of the significant points of difference.
First, it may be helpful to distinguish clearly between (a) the morally intuited sense of "what ought (or ought not) to be done to another human being" that the term "rights" is meant to denote and (b) the modern, Western, theoretical construction/explanation of what "rights" are and how they work. It seems to me that Dan is primarily concerned with safeguarding the place and role of the former, whereas Mike's concerns and critiques are aimed at the latter.
Second, I wonder if the relationship between human rights (for which an adequate description appears still to be pending) and the kingdom of God might be likened to the relationship between a support beam and a house. By itself, the beam is just a big plank of wood. It is only as it is incorporated into the house that it comes to have a role within the house. One could, however, instead try to integrate it into some other structure, or wield it as a clumsy but deadly bludgeon to cave in the skull of one's enemy. But if the carpenter does include this beam in the house, it fulfills a vital and necessary role in the house. Indeed, if the carpenter doesn't include this beam in the house, he will need to go out and find some other object with the same length, width, thickness, weight, and tensile strength as this rejected beam so that he can substitute it into the beam's place.
If I am right, then @Michael Raburn (https://www.vineyardscholars.org/forum/index.php?action=profile;u=307) is right to insist that the wooden beam is not the house, nor even necessarily part of the house. It could as easily be a murder weapon or a plank in a nearby mansion's poolside deck. Furthermore, this particular plank in front of us (i.e. the modern, Western concept of human rights) might be flawed and unable to bear the load it needs to as a support beam in God's house. At the same time, @Daniel L Heck (https://www.vineyardscholars.org/forum/index.php?action=profile;u=425) is right that the house needs a support beam here, and if the one in front of us is flawed then we need to find another that will fit the required dimensions closely while providing equal or superior strength. One can't just declare it flawed and unnecessary and leave it out. Some object has to be in that place, doing that job, or else the structural soundness of the house as a whole will be compromised.
-
Thanks for the helpful mediation, Jon. I think Michael and I probably agree on a lot of the substance here, underneath...at the same time, I think there are implications to some of this language that are important to work through.
Here's how I'd put my claims into your metaphor, Jon: if friendship (or a community of friendship) is like a house, then rights are part of the foundation. If someone tells you, "We need houses, not foundations!" I'd say they must not understand how good houses are made, or they aren't sincere about the house-building.
If they go on to say, "Look around your house. How often do you think about the foundation?" I'd say: exactly. If a house has a good foundation, you almost never think about it. If they say, "The foundations were laid poorly!" I'd say, "Yes. That's an argument for laying good foundations. It isn't an argument against foundations." The same holds if they say, "The foundation is being destroyed." And if they say, "You can't live in a foundation," or "Foundations aren't enough" or "Foundations aren't the ultimate end," I'd say: exactly. You live in the thing that is built on the foundation. None of these are arguments against foundations, or a reason to critique or negate them. However, they may be a necessary critique of people who have misunderstood the role of a foundation.
So if anyone is simply saying that rights, alone, aren't enough to arrive at the "beloved community," I'm with them 110%. If they want to go on to say that any relatively "beloved community" before the end of history is not the Kingdom of God, I'm also with them 110%. But I would say that in history, relatively beloved communities reflect, anticipate and take part in some aspect of God's plan to fully restore humanity. In this way, they are "already" taking part in the Kingdom...it is already there, in their midst, to the degree that the beloved community actually exists. Rights are a foundational aspect of this.
And I think that in the new heavens and the new earth, humans will still bear the image of God, with all of the rights, entitlement and authority that implies. Rights, in their redeemed sense, will remain part of the foundation of the Temple of Creation, filled completely with God's Spirit. In fact, I think it is the laying down of rights (and our bodies) that is a temporary measure...eternity is not crucifixion. It is resurrection. Heaven is not a boot stamping on a human face forever.
(And yes, I'm focused on rights in sense (a). Although I think (b) actually contains some pretty good theories of (a). It isn't an arid wasteland of empty abstractions, built on deistic assumptions. That is, I think, a drastic mis-characterization of (b)).
-
I want to go back to how Dan narrated the Old South because I think that highlights my point better. It is historically not the case that modern secular human rights brought about an end to slavery in the United States. In fact, the founding documents were steeped in just that sort of Lockean rights language (and I think that is an adequate beginning for giving a definition of human rights and I did link the UN statement above as well) and yet slavery was baked into the institutions founded on human rights logic.
It was the radical revivals of the Great Awakening that set the U.S. on an inevitable path to the
Civil War and the end of slavery. Prior to the GA, it was illegal to share the Gospel with slaves. But the early Methodists and Baptists broke those laws and preached to slaves anyway. This led to revival among the slaves, the beginning of 'The Invisible Institution' (slave churches meeting in secret), and the abolitionist movement. Yes, by 1850 Southern churches had accommodated themselves to slavery and widely preached it as a good, but that spin control was too late, and only served to prolong the war since both sides were convinced they had a divine mandate.
My point is, modern human rights did not effect an end to slavery in the United States, it found a way to legalize and normalize it (the deistic tendencies of the complicit Anglican church helped a lot too and are wrapped up in this narrative - and should serve as a warning to us). What brought about an end to slavery was the in-breaking of the kingdom of God in the form of the Great Awakening revivals that radically reshaped the religious and moral landscape of America. That is the work of the kingdom of God. And it is not work that modernity can emulate.
-
Quick note, your point here @Michael Raburn (https://www.vineyardscholars.org/forum/index.php?action=profile;u=307) really resonated with me. I have often pointed out to my students that standard end-run move when individuals want to get around human rights, is the re-definition of "human" and/or "person". This works for them because a definition of "human" or "person" has to be brought to rights discussions from without. Agape on the other hand, moves from the love of God to the love of that which God loves and makes no space for exceptions based on definition. Agape is just less "lawyerable" than rights.
-
@Michael Raburn (https://www.vineyardscholars.org/forum/index.php?action=profile;u=307)
(I've cleaned up this post substantially)
The basic point I'm arguing here is that emancipation from slavery is necessarily an extension of human rights. I think that this is a definitional question before it is even a historical question. What we mean by emancipation must be an extension of human rights, if "emancipation" is to mean what we normally mean by it. To suggest that emancipation, insofar as it happened, didn't involve human rights is a contradiction in terms, just like "we need friendship, not rights" is a contradiction in terms. (I'd also note that the definition of modern human rights as secular rights is in dispute here. See Wolterstorff.) And so suggesting that "human rights didn't effect an end of slavery," is like saying, "hydrogen doesn't effect water." It is a basic category mistake, which suggests some basic empirical mistakes may also be going on as well. (As does a statement like this: We need water, not hydrogen!)
Still, let's discuss the actual history of opposition to slavery, prior to emancipation, as well. Insofar as revival gave rise to abolitionism, this was an opposition that integrated human rights discourse at a basic level...and there were a lot of people who were part of this movement who weren't influenced by revivalism in any kind of obvious way. For example, Thomas Paine was hardly a revivalist...he was about as secular and humanist as they came, and he was also an advocate of human rights and an early opponent of slavery. Moving on from there, Frederick Douglass was hardly a critic of human rights or natural law, although his vision was deeply religious. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frederick-douglass/#NatLaw. In their embrace of human rights, I don't think they were exceptional abolitionists...they were typical. And in possessing divergent religious views, they were also "typical" of abolitionism. What really united abolitionists was opposition to slavery, and across the spectrum, this opposition was clearly and consistently connected to human rights.
So at minimum, the historical picture is way more complicated than "secular modernists who appealed to secular human rights were the pro-slavery people (like Locke!), and Christian revivalists who opposed secular human rights were the anti-slavery people." I'm not even confident that these tropes reflect general trends, let alone a satisfying total account of events. Even Locke's own position on slavery is highly ambiguous, and a matter of dispute...and his religious views are also, similarly, highly debatable. For example, some of Locke's arguments that get him flagged as a "deist" are basically Thomistic arguments. The nexus of "Locke-secularism-humanism-deism-human rights-slavery," is itself highly contested and rather dubious at each point...even before we go on to ask things like, "How much influence did Locke even have on the American Revolution?" Once you start asking whether abolitionists were critics of human rights, or advocates for them, I think the narrative implied by the claim that "human rights didn't bring an end to slavery," falls apart. Human rights were a big part of what people in, and cooperating with, the black churches were advocating. To set them against each other is a total false dichotomy.
But more narrowly, of course, I'm not saying that "human rights ended slavery." I don't think "human rights" are a historical agent. Rather, the end of slavery was itself a recognition of human rights. This is what it was, as a matter of fact, and it was also how the people who enacted it understood it. This was accomplished through a historical process in which the action of people, empowered by the Holy Spirit, played an important role. And all truth is God's truth, so God is the ultimate author of any good that was accomplished at all. I believe that God is the ultimate author of human rights, independent of any causal role played by revivalism. (God's actions are certainly not constrained to revivalism!)
So to say, "the founding documents were steeped in just that sort of Lockean rights language..." doesn't really reflect the complex dynamics here. Rights language was also integral to abolitionism. Your arguments here seem to imply that it wasn't. If that's what you're saying, I think this gets the history wrong.
At any rate, my illustration of Old South rhetoric was simply intended as an illustration of how the appeal to love and friendship, paired with a critique of human rights, actually worked in Old South apologetics. None of the point I was making with that example depends on these broader historical questions. (Although they are germane to the broader discussion!) Instead, the illustration is designed to help us discern why those kinds of arguments seem appealing (to those who don't want change), mirror some of what I'm hearing now, and are total b.s. My point is that "you need Christian friendship and love, not human rights," was, precisely, one of the arguments used to justify slavery. My critique of this argument is that it represents a misunderstanding of friendship and love, which creates a smokescreen justifying the violation of rights. A proper understanding of love must include respect for human rights.
-
You can misuse either Christian teaching or human rights logic to justify all sorts of atrocities. History is full of examples of both.
My point was that the game changer, what reshaped the moral landscape in a country that had been okay with slavery since its inception, was the Great Awakening. Neither status quo Christianity nor the crafting of founding documents that included serious national conversations about human rights moved the needle at all against slavery. What made the difference was the sovereign work of God and the in-breaking of God's kingdom. Human rights focus doesn't get us that. Sadly, neither does Christian theology most of the time.
-
I'm glad to re-engage this conversation :)
What I'd say is that the history of the Great Awakening is too ambivalent for me to accept that this particular movement was "the difference." Just a few counter-facts to complicate the story: George Whitefield advocated the re-institution of slavery in Georgia. The movement here was actually backwards. Presbyterians were one of the main denominations impacted by the Great Awakening, but they were hardly champions of abolitionism...while the Quakers weren't quite part of it (in my understanding), but were a center for abolitionism. This isn't to deny that the establishment of Black churches in the Great Awakening played an important role in abolition. But as a theological-historical matter, this is the question I bring to the discussion: "Was the revivalism of The Great Awakening _the_ means by which God made a difference, or did God use other means as well?" I'd need a lot more convincing to get there, based on the little that I know about the period, and the general complexity of historical causation / difference-making. I'm pretty sure a whole lot of things made essential differences, because that's how history works. Still, if other things also mattered, and even if they mattered far more than revivalism, that doesn't suggest to me that God's sovereign activity was any less important.
The other main focus of my critique can simply be summarized like this: "The Kingdom and human rights aren't in opposition. On the contrary, I think they're aligned." The rest is an elaboration on why I think that is, and why I think it is important.
-
Well, I'm glad you left some role for the sovereignty of God. Always good to give God a cookie when we can.
Alignment is too strong a word. All the human rights in the world doesn't bring in the kingdom of God. I thought we had learned that from the failure of Protestant liberalism.
-
On the contrary, from where I sit, it looks like you're the one making too little room for the sovereignty of God!
Rather than alignment, I think it might be better to say, "is entirely taken up within." But then, alignment is to weak a word. If anything is diminished here, it isn't God, but revivalism. Insofar as it seems the other way, I think it is because revivalism has been conflated with God.
Insofar as "Protestant liberalism" is a meaningful phrase, I would map your discourse onto it, not mine. It is deism that rejects God's activity throughout Creation, as if it were a separate domain. Insofar as it seems like I'm brushing crumbs to God, it seems to me that there must be some assumption that the Created order is somehow distant from God, creating a separate, secularized domain. Your post-liberal Protestantism is still too liberal and Protestant for me!
At any rate, I don't think I've said at any point that human rights bring the kingdom of God. That is not, at all, remotely, even a little bit, kind of sort of, what I'm saying. Rather, when the Kingdom of God comes, human rights are respected ... but much, much more than that happens as well.
-
Some other questions for discussion: it looks to me like the implicit narrative in your comment is that the failure of Protestant liberalism was a result of acting as if human rights would bring the kingdom of God.
I'd like to understand what you mean by that. What is Protestant liberalism? (Specifically, historically. There are a lot of things you might be talking about, but I'd like some historical specifics. For example, established German churches that capitulated to German nationalism and militarism are one thing. Independent American churches that participated in the Civil Rights Movement and the American peace movement, in collaboration with black churches which are still going strong, are another thing. This term seems to bundle these two very different things together quite tightly...and if you're suggesting that the two are basically the same thing, I'm going to need a lot more convincing.)
What are the marks of liberal Protestantism's failure?
And why do you think that a belief that human rights would bring the kingdom of God made a difference (the difference?) in its failure? I'm not condoning this view. I'm just trying to figure out what we're actually talking about, and whether it is something that corresponds to reality.
Reference to something that I should read, which makes a careful historical case for your narrative, would be helpful :)
-
Thinking about this more, because I think the discussion is productive and sits at the heart of my concerns.
For me, the claim that revivalism made "the difference," and nothing else did, looks like simplistic modeling inspired by monocausal Newtonian physics. (;) If we're going to roll with loose critiques of 'modernism') Part of what is missing here is the texture, complexity and "tragedy" that we find in Biblical narratives, and which I think we also find in the real history of abolitionism and Civil Rights. For example, when I look at the Second Great Awakening, I see a powerful movement of God that dissolved existing hierarchies and social divisions, and connected people in surprising new ways. (Mixed in with a bunch of other stuff, too.) However, the people who were marked out by God's activity betrayed their own call, and went on to destroy a lot of what was made. And so, God's work was carried forward by Cyrus, instead of the people among whom God had initially moved so powerfully. (ie: the union army effected abolition, not revivals.) God's agency is not restricted to revivalism, or to a certain people who were marked out by God's activity.
Here's how I'd tell this story: Sometimes people who have experienced this kind of calling from God see some aspect of the Kingdom come in their midst, but then they turn and reject it. Then, the institutions birthed through God's action shift away from faithfulness to God's activity in history, and toward self-preservation and submission to the world. As they do this, they often see themselves as the heroes preserving the true religion, and their own tradition, in just the moment that they stand under judgment from God. They've lost the thread of the story, and so they accuse "the culture" for rejecting God's call, when they are the ones who heard their calling and rejected it...and in fact, "the culture"/Babylon/Cyrus carries forward the work that God had originally intended to be done differently, by his people.
Something like this story might be said to repeat, starting on Azusa Street. Instead of getting Civil Rights acknowledged through the collapse of cooperation with Jim Crowe, or a velvet revolution driven by de-segregated churches, we got them acknowledged through LBJ. Pentecostals split largely along racial lines, and Civil Rights legislation passed in spite of opposition from the SBC...which was itself, substantially, a product of the Second Great Awakening. So I just don't buy the story that the SGA set us on an inevitable path toward abolition (and racial reconciliation more broadly), I think its ongoing legacy is far more ambiguous. I'm not even sure if its aggregate effect was positive or negative, in terms of "causing" abolition and racial reconciliation...and I'm not sure that is even the kind of story we should be telling, or expecting.
If there is any sufficient, proximate historical cause for abolition, as it happened through the Civil War, I'd have to say that the original Constitutional compromises set up a conflict of interests between the slaveholding south, and the non-slaveholding North. I don't buy that...it really isn't that simple. But it seems far more plausible than the claim that the Second Great Awakening caused abolition, and the compromises of the Constitution didn't "move the needle at all".