Human Rights or something better - what am I missing?

[Brian Metzger]

My perspective in this presentation was that Hauerwas staked out the Kingdom position and our two Kingdom theologians opted for positions based on human systems.  I was baffled by this session.  It seemed to me that Hauerwas argued that the Kingdom offers something better, something more robust than "rights."  I asked a question for clarification and mentioned the sermon on the mount and Php 2 as examples of Kingdom living going beyond rights.  Derek responded by talking about the beautitudes but I was thinking of "if someone forces you to go one mile...." a clear denial of my "right" as a Kingdom citizen as well as other examples in that context. Php 2 is an obvious plea from Paul to empty ourselves of whatever rights we may think we have in order to be like Jesus in attitude and action.  Has anyone been doing anymore thinking about Kingdom theology and the idea of inalienable rights?

[Dave Pantzer]

Interesting.  Hauerwas seemed in part to object to human rights language because of a slippery slope argument, in which it's hard to "bound" such rights.  This article seems thematically related:

http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/offbeat/judge-gives-chimpanzees-human-rights-for-the-first-time/ar-AAbqjQo?ocid=iehp

[Jon Stovell]

I agree that it was kind of an odd session. I'm looking forward to receiving the written documents so that I can chew on them a bit more.

My general impression walking away from the session was the following:

• The concept of human rights developed in a Western context and makes sense primarily within that cultural context, and critique of the validity of the concept appears to be a matter of Westerners engaging in critical reflection on our own received tradition.
• The concept of human rights has had real and demonstrable pragmatic value for furthering the causes of reconciliation and justice in, e.g., South Africa.
• But acknowledging that pragmatic value doesn't really address the concerns of the critical reflection on the concept's validity mentioned above. All it really proves is that before we dismantle the concept of human rights, we better make darn sure that we have something better to put in its place.

The cynic in me wants to say that it seems all well and good to critique the concept of human rights as we sit in a position of privilege, but people in a position of privilege ought not to be the ones to do so. Another part of me wants to acknowledge that the concept does appear to be flawed and muddled and ought to be replaced by something better. I believe the Christian tradition does have the resources to provide something better, but until we articulate that clearly and boldly, I'm not going to advocate that we tear down the imperfect but serviceable structure we have now. After all, even if we do construct a better notion, it won't be perfect either. It might indeed be better, though, so why not give it a shot and see if we can?

[Brian Metzger]

I think human rights is absolutely the best the world has to offer.  I think Hauerwas' point is that rights language and practice is still anemic compared to the Kingdom and that our call is to live in but not of the system of the world.  If we can offer a better way, we should, and we can.

Human Rights, I would say, might be able to make me bake a cake for a same sex wedding, but it can't make me love the two people getting married.  The Kingdom of God, however, active in my life as the Spirit and embodied by Jesus, can and does.  Thus, the Kingdom is vastly superior to any sort of rights in that it can make friends out of enemies and bakers out of haters.

Hauerwas is clearly for all the things human rights wants to achieve, as am I, but the Kingdom offers a better way.

[Jon Stovell]

Sounds good to me. I think you've got a new research project, @Brian Metzger. I look forward to seeing what you come up with!

[Billie Hoard]

I was really interested in/hoping to hear more about Hauerwas' critique of Morphew's claim that our understanding of human rights is grounded in Scripture through the enlightenment and reformation (particularly Locke and Calvin as I recall). Hauerwas response seemed to amount to "I don't really want to follow in the footsteps/reasoning of Locke and Calvin".

I know that Locke did ground his understanding of human rights (life, liberty, and property) in his belief that we are fundamentally God's property, but as I read Locke, he also believes that those rights inexorably demand the establishment of a social contract. I can definitely see how Hauerwas would want to avoid contract as the lens through which we interpret our relationships with one another, and the historical argument both of them made would seem to suggest that the human rights construction is fundamentally bound up in an earthly politics rather than a politics of Kingdom. Would it be appropriate to say that human rights analysis is the what Jesus' followers might use if His Kingdom were of this world? And if so then is it a necessary corollary to say that since His Kingdom is not of this world, rights are not a great framework for understanding the value and dignity of those who bear the imago dei?

[Jeffrey Koperski]

I don't know about Hauerwas, but the distinction is usually made between natural rights--what you have just because you are a human being--and legal rights--what you get from the government.  Social contract theory has to do with the latter.  Locke believed in both types of rights, with the source of natural rights being God, of course.

[Billie Hoard]

Right but if I am understanding the Second Treatise correctly,  Locke starts with natural rights and argues that legal rights,  together with the social contract and eventually a state are necessary to escape an otherwise inevitable state of war. Thus civil society is built on a foundation of natural (human) rights,  without them, Locke cannot justify his social contract.

[Jeffrey Koperski]

That might be right, but I'm not sure about the last claim.  Hobbes, for example, justified the social contract purely on the grounds that everyone wants out of the state of nature, at least in the long run.  He and Locke had very different views about natural rights, however.

[Billie Hoard]

Again, I'm not sure I read the Leviathan that way. I take Hobbes to be affirming a set of natural (human) rights as well, only he argues that in order to guarantee the one he sees as most important (the right to life), we are forced to abrogate all other rights to the State (the Leviathan). Locke is more optimistic in thinking that individuals are able to maintain a larger selection of their rights in the creation of a state, but both seem to be basing their social contract on a doctrine of natural rights and the desire to avoid a state of war.

[Daniel L Heck]

Hobbes on natural rights:

First law of nature: Seek peace and follow it.

The second branch contains in summary form the right of nature, which is the right to defend ourselves by any means we can.

From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to seek peace, is derived this second law:

Second law of nature: When a man thinks that peace and self-defence require it, he should be willing (when others are too) to lay down his right to everything, and should be contented with as much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself.

For as long as every man maintains his right to do anything he likes, all men are in the condition of war. But if other men won’t also lay down their right, there is no reason for him to divest himself of his; for ·if he alone gave up his rights· that would be to expose himself to predators (which no man is obliged to do) rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is the law of the Gospel: Whatever you require others to do to you, do it to them.

And this law of all men: Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris—·Don’t do to others what you don’t want done to you.

[In the interests of clarity, the next paragraph is written in terms of
‘I and ‘you’, replacing Hobbes’s ‘a man’ and ‘another’.] For me to lay down my right to something is for me to deprive myself of the liberty of blocking you (for instance) from getting the benefit of your right to the same thing. In renouncing or giving up my right I don’t give anyone else a right that he didn’t previously have, because every man has a right by nature to everything. All I do in renouncing my own right·is to stand out of your way, so that you can enjoy your own original right without interference from me; but you may still be impeded by some third person. Thus, the effect on you of my lacking a certain right is just a lessening of hindrances to your exercise of your original right

In other words, "This land is my land, this land is your land...so let's all kill each other. Therefore...authoritarianism based on the consent of the crushed!"

http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/hobbes1651part1.pdf

[Daniel L Heck]

My main critique of Hauerwas is that he negates too much...maybe even for himself.

For example:

"Like Wolterstorff, I too want those who suffer from Alzheimers to have the care that befits their status as human beings. Such care I believe, moreover, is a matter of justice. But I do not think such care is more likely to be forthcoming or sustained by a natural right theory of justice. Instead, what is required is the recovery of communion made possible through the works of mercy.

In particular, a text such as Matthew 25:31-45 makes clear that the works of mercy are not principles or values that then must be translated into a more universal or secular vision of justice. Rather they summon us to participate in God's redemption by feeding the hungry, giving drink to the thirsty, clothing the naked, harbouring the stranger, visiting the sick, ministering to prisoners and burying the dead. This is how we learn what it means for Jesus to be the justice of God.

I know of no book that exemplifies better this understanding of Jesus as God's justice than Hans Reinders's Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theological Anthropology, and Ethics. Reinders observes that much good has been done in the name of disability-rights for creating new opportunities as well as institutional space for the disabled. But such an understanding of justice is not sufficient if we listen to the disabled. They do not seek to be tolerated or even respected because they have rights. Rather they seek to share their lives with us and they want us to want to share our lives with them. In short they want us to be claimed and to claim one another in friendship."

It is one thing to say, (1) "We don't need rights. We just need friendship." It is another thing entirely to say, (2) "Rights are a good step, but they aren't sufficient, and they aren't the end we ultimately aim for, which can't be delivered by rights alone." Sometimes, Hauerwas says the first. (It is what he said to me, at SVS). But then, he goes on to articulate the second. I have big problems with (1), but I'm totally in agreement with (2).

I'd also say that good friendships integrate a respect for the rights of other people, and so setting friendship against rights isn't really helpful. Friendship includes and extends beyond respect for the rights of others. However, an acknowledgment of rights is in no way a threat to real friendship. When rights are violated, friendship is also violated...and respect for the rights of another person is an essential aspect of restoring friendship in these cases. Friendship is altogether bigger than rights, but it contains and depends on them. Friendship without rights is an abusive boss sidling up to you and acting like your friend.

I'd articulate my problems with (1) by insisting on reading Matthew 25:31-45 in the context of Matthew 24-25, as part of God's judgment on a legal and political system (Herod's Second Temple "Israel"). Because reading Matthew 25 in the context of Matthew's Gospel more broadly is really all that I ever do

[Billie Hoard]

@Daniel L Heck I really like your breakdown/distinction regarding rights and friendship but it strikes me that where Hauerwas claimed that rights were fine so long as they are understood as a secular and limited expression of the call to love and value all creation (and particularly God's image bearers), your understanding of friendship (as insufficient on its own) does not account for what might be called "true friendship." So I would be really comfortable saying that Agape is the best framework/language for motivating human relationships - far superior to human rights. And as I see it, "friendship" may or may not mean "agape towards persons". If it does then Friendship would seem to be your "greater than rights" construction, whereas if it means anything else it is your "less than rights" construction. I haven't read any Hauerwas (gonna get on that asap though) but is it possible that he is defining friendship as "agape towards persons" which would resolve the apparent tension in what he was saying last week?

[Daniel L Heck]

@Bill Hoard I can see how my comments might have been confusing, and I think we probably agree on what "true friendship" looks like. I'm saying that friendship must include respect for rights (and more) to be "true friendship." So if I talk about "friendship minus rights" I'm talking about something less than true friendship...it is incoherent. Your jerk boss isn't really your friend, even if he gets you a cup of water when you're thirsty, if he also tries to keep you from getting health care benefits. So I think that saying, "Disabled people don't need rights, they need friends," is basically incoherent. Friends of the disabled advocate for their rights. Literally. I'm sure, at this very moment, the friends of a lot of disabled and homeless people are advocating for their rights in all kinds of ways. They may be speaking to legislators, working with lawyers or wrestling their way through the SSDI system. That isn't all they do, but it is one of the things involved in friendship.

Just one personal example: I have a good friend who has severe birth defects. She lived with us for several years as her condition worsened, and we supported her as she worked her way through the SSDI system to get the benefits to which we believed she was entitled. They are her right (I would say as a matter of both positive and natural law.) However, she was initially rejected (as often happens), and my wife (a paralegal) provided her with some advice throughout the process. It would have been really, really gross for me to say to her, "You don't need rights. You just need our friendship. So we aren't going to help you with the SSDI process. Just rely on God, and get rid of your grasping, nasty sense of entitlement. Rights. Pfah! This "rights" $hi+ is totally getting out of hand. What duty are you performing that justifies you claiming SSDI? Rights stem from duties, you know." What kind of friend would say crap like that?

Having said that, our friendship was about a whole lot more than advocating for her rights and helping her recieve the benefits to which she was entitled by (relatively) just laws. But if it were about less than that, given how close we were, I don't think it could be an authentic friendship.

And back to Hauerwas: I think there is a lot of tension between his different statements. That's just part of being Hauerwas...and probably part of being human So I should be clear that, here, I'm responding to some specific things he has said, and one of the central ways he frames the discussion. Insofar as Hauerwas(2) disagrees with Hauerwas(1), I'm totally with Hauerwas(2).

[Billie Hoard]

So the thing is,  if friendship is defined as "agape towards persons" the in your example,  wouldn't that lead friends to say something closer to "you don't need rights because as your friends we are,  of course,  going to help you with this Side process". What I am thinking is that if rights language limits my responsibility toward the other,  agape has no limits. Rights says "I and the state are morally obligated to go so far"  and that is certainly better than nothing,  but agape says "I love you and will go as far as you need without looking to my own rights". Maybe I am not seeing the limitation to friendship (understood as agape towards persons) that you are?